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Abstract
Boolean functions are important building blocks in cryptography for their wide
application in both stream and block cipher systems. For cryptanalysis of such
systems one tries to find out linear functions that are correlated to the Boolean
functions used in the crypto system. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function and its
Walsh spectra is denoted by Wf (ω) at the point ω ∈ {0, 1}n. The Boolean function
is available in the form of an oracle. We like to find an ω such that Wf (ω) 6= 0
as this will provide one of the linear functions which are correlated to f . We show
that the quantum algorithm proposed by Deutsch and Jozsa (1992) solves the above
mentioned problem in constant time. However, the best known classical algorithm to
solve this problem requires exponential time in n. We also analyse certain classes of
cryptographically significant Boolean functions and highlight how the basic Deutsch-
Jozsa algorithm performs on them.
Keywords: Boolean Functions, Query Complexity, Quantum Algorithms, Walsh Spec-
tra.
1 Introduction
Many of the symmetric (private) key crypto systems use nonlinear Boolean functions in
the design process. Nonlinearity is an important property of Boolean functions to resist
the linear cryptanalysis [15] on block cipher systems like DES. Apart from nonlinearity,
the Boolean functions should also possess other cryptographic properties. In the nonlinear
combiner model of stream cipher systems, correlation immunity is an important cryp-
tographic property for a Boolean function to be used in the schemes [23, 24]. Both the
nonlinearity and the correlation immunity can be described in terms of Walsh spectra of the
Boolean function (see Subsection 1.1 for exact details). Construction of highly nonlinear
and correlation immune Boolean functions are available in literature (see [23, 21, 22, 19, 5]
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and the references in these papers). Even if a Boolean function is highly nonlinear and cor-
relation immune of certain order, due to the Parseval’s relation [8], there always exist linear
functions which are correlated to the Boolean function in use. In the design, it is always
attempted to reduce the correlation, which is the the job of the cryptographer. On the
other hand, the cryptanalyst tries to exploit the correlation to mount the attack (see [4, 14]
and the references in these papers for more details). To device such an attack, one needs a
linear function which is correlated to the Boolean function. Given an n-variable Boolean
function f , this requires the Walsh spectra of the Boolean function and the Fast Walsh
Transform algorithm requires O(n2n) time when the truth table of the Boolean function
is available. If the Boolean function is available in the form of an oracle (black box), then
2n steps are required to get the truth table and then only the Fast Walsh Transform can
be applied. This is the best known classical algorithm known in this area. On the other
hand we identify that the well known Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm [7] can solve this problem in
constant time under the quantum computational framework. It has been commented [17,
Page 36] that the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm has not much application in practical sense.
This is the first time we show how this algorithm can be used to solve a problem which
naturally comes from cryptographic domain.
Now we like to point out the importance of the problem from the quantum complexity
theoretic viewpoint. For detailed discussion on complexity classes and their hierarchies
see [17, 9]. The Deutsch-Jozsa problem [7] (distinguishing between balanced and constant
Boolean functions) presents relativized separation of P and EQP, but not of BPP and BQP.
In [2], Bernstein and Vazirani presented relativized separation between BPP and BQP using
recursive Fourier sampling. Though the problem is important from complexity theoretic
point of view, it has been commented to be artificial [1]. Bernstein and Vazirani [3] have
further shown the relativized separation of NP and even MA from BQP and conjectured
that recursive Fourier sampling is not in PH (related discussion is also available in [1]).
Green and Pruim [10] presented relativized separation between BQP and PNP using a
nice technique based on Grover’s algorithm [11]. Aaronson has commented in [1] that
it may need a completely different problem than recursive Fourier sampling to provide a
relativized separation between BQP and PH. The problems we mention here (specifically
see Problem 5 in Section 2) may be a good candidate in this direction.
1.1 Preliminaries: Boolean Functions
A Boolean function on n variables may be viewed as a mapping from {0, 1}n into {0, 1}.
The set of all n-variable Boolean functions is denoted by Ωn.
A Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn) is also interpreted as the output column of its truth
table f , i.e., a binary string of length 2n,
f = [f(0, 0, · · · , 0), f(1, 0, · · · , 0), f(0, 1, · · · , 0), . . . , f(1, 1, · · · , 1)].
If a Boolean function is presented as an oracle (a black box), then one can only present an
n-bit input and get the 1-bit output corresponding to that. Thus, to get the truth table,
one needs to query the oracle 2n times in a classical computational model.
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The Hamming distance between S1, S2 is denoted by d(S1, S2), i.e., d(S1, S2) = #(S1 6=
S2). Also the Hamming weight or simply the weight of a binary string S is the number of
ones in S. This is denoted by wt(S). An n-variable function f is said to be balanced if its
output column in the truth table contains equal number of 0’s and 1’s (i.e., wt(f) = 2n−1).
Let us denote addition operator over GF (2) by ⊕. An n-variable Boolean function
f(x1, . . . , xn) can be considered to be a multivariate polynomial over GF (2). This poly-
nomial can be expressed as a sum of products representation of all distinct k-th order
products (0 ≤ k ≤ n) of the variables. More precisely, f(x1, . . . , xn) can be written as
a0 ⊕
⊕
1≤i≤n
aixi ⊕
⊕
1≤i<j≤n
aijxixj ⊕ · · · ⊕ a12...nx1x2 . . . xn,
where the coefficients a0, aij, . . . , a12...n ∈ {0, 1}. This representation of f is called the
algebraic normal form (ANF) of f . The number of variables in the highest order product
term with nonzero coefficient is called the algebraic degree, or simply the degree of f and
denoted by deg(f).
Functions of degree at most one are called affine functions. An affine function with
constant term equal to zero is called a linear function. The set of all n-variable affine
(respectively linear) functions is denoted by A(n) (respectively L(n)). The nonlinearity of
an n-variable function f is
nl(f) = ming∈A(n)(d(f, g)),
i.e., the distance from the set of all n-variable affine functions.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) and ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) both belong to {0, 1}n and the inner product
x · ω = x1ω1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xnωn.
Let f(x) be a Boolean function on n variables. Then the Walsh transform of f(x) is a real
valued function over {0, 1}n which is defined as
Wf (ω) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)f(x)⊕x·ω.
Given a Boolean function f , Wf (ω) = #(f = l) − #(f 6= l), where l = ω · x is a
linear function. If Wf (ω) = 0, then there is no correlation between f and l. However, if
Wf(ω) > 0, then there is correlation between f, l as #(f = l) > #(f 6= l). Similarly, if
Wf(ω) < 0, then there is correlation between f, 1⊕ l as #(f = l) < #(f 6= l), which gives
#(f = 1 ⊕ l) > #(f 6= 1 ⊕ l). This correlation between the Boolean function f and the
linear function l (or the affine function 1⊕ l) is exploited for cryptanalytic attacks [4, 14].
Thus, given a Boolean function f , it is important to find out some ω such that Wf (ω) 6= 0.
It should be noted that getting the Walsh spectra is not an easy problem in general.
See Algorithm 1 in this Section and Proposition 1 in Section 2 later for further discussion.
In terms of Walsh spectra, the nonlinearity of f is given by
nl(f) = 2n−1 − 1
2
max
ω∈{0,1}n
|Wf(ω)|.
3
One important identity related to the Walsh spectra of any n-variable Boolean function
f is the Parseval’s identity [8] which gives
∑
ω∈{0,1}n
W 2f (ω) = 2
2n.
It is clear that the maximum nonlinearity is achieved when the maximum absolute value
of the Walsh spectra is minimized. For n even, this happens when Wf(ω) = ±2n2 , for
each ω ∈ {0, 1}n. These functions, having nonlinearity 2n−1 − 2n2−1, are well known as
bent functions in literature [20, 6]. For n odd, n
2
is not an integer and hence the situation
becomes more complicated. For n ≤ 7, it is known that the maximum possible nonlinearity
can be 2n−1−2n−12 [16]. It has been shown in [18] that one can achieve nonlinearity strictly
greater than 2n−1 − 2n−12 for n ≥ 15.
In [12], an important characterization of resilient (balanced and correlation immune)
functions has been presented, which we use as the definition here. A function f(x1, . . . , xn)
is m-resilient iff its Walsh transform satisfies
Wf(ω) = 0, for 0 ≤ wt(ω) ≤ m.
As the notation used in [21, 22], by an (n,m, d, σ) function we denote an n-variable, m-
resilient function with degree d and nonlinearity σ. For recent results on such functions
see [21, 22, 5] and the references in these papers.
Now let us present the best known classical algorithm for calculating the Walsh spectra
of a Boolean function. If the function is given as a black box, then one needs to get the
truth table first, which requires 2n many query to the oracle.
Algorithm 1
Input:
(i) A Boolean function f on n variables is
available in the form of an oracle (black box);
1. Oracle f is queried 2n many times to get the truth
table as an integer array f [0, . . . , 2n − 1] of 0, 1;
2. for (i = 0; i < 2n; i = i+ 1) f [i] = (−1)f [i];
3. for (i = 0; i < n; i = i+ 1) {
3a. for (k = 0; k < 2n; k = k + 2i+1) {
3a(i). for (j = k; j < k + 2i; j = j + 1) {
3a(i)A. a = f [j] + f [j + 2i];
3a(i)B. b = f [j]− f [j + 2i];
3a(i)C. f [j] = a;
3a(i)D. f [j + 2i] = b;
3a(ii). }
3b. }
4. }
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In the following we present an example how the Algorithm 1 runs. Note that the
function used is a 3-variable one, and i varies from 0 to 2, i.e., n = 3 steps. The inner
steps (using k, j) runs 23 = 8 many times.
x3 x2 x1 f (−1)f i = 0 i = 1 i = 2
0 0 0 1 -1 -2 -2 0
0 0 1 1 -1 0 2 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 -2 -4
0 1 1 1 -1 2 -2 4
1 0 0 1 -1 0 2 -4
1 0 1 0 1 -2 -2 4
1 1 0 0 1 2 -2 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 -2 0
1.2 Preliminaries: The Deutsch-Jozsa Algorithm
Given f is either constant or balanced, one may ask for an algorithm, that can answer
what exactly it is. In this case the Boolean function f is available in the form of an oracle
(black box), where one can apply an input to the black box to get the output. A classical
algorithm needs to check the function for 2n−1 + 1 many inputs in worst case to decide
whether the function is constant or balanced.
Now we discuss the quantum computational model. It is known that given a classical
circuit f , there is a quantum circuit of comparable efficiency which computes the transfor-
mation Uf that takes input like |x, y〉 and produces output like |x, y ⊕ f(x)〉. Given such
an Uf is available, Deutsch-Jozsa [7] provided a quantum algorithm that can solve this
problem in constant time. We first present how the quantum circuit looks like in Figure 1
and then explain the algorithm in Algorithm 2.
|0〉
|1〉
  
n
H
H⊗n H⊗n M
y
x x
y ⊕ f(x)
Uf
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
|ψ0〉 |ψ1〉 |ψ2〉 |ψ3〉
Figure 1: Quantum circuit to implement Deutsch-Jozsa Algorithm
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Algorithm 2 Deutsch-Jozsa Algorithm [7]
1. |ψ0〉 = |0〉⊗n|1〉
2. |ψ1〉 = ∑x∈{0,1}n |x〉√2n
[ |0〉−|1〉√
2
]
3. |ψ2〉 = ∑x∈{0,1}n (−1)
f(x)|x〉√
2n
[ |0〉−|1〉√
2
]
4. |ψ3〉 = ∑z∈{0,1}n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·z⊕f(x)|z〉
2n
[ |0〉−|1〉√
2
]
5. Measurement at M : all zero state implies that the function is constant,
otherwise it is balanced.
In the next section we will keep the Algorithm 2 as it is and interpret the Step 5 of it
according to our need.
2 Problems in EQP
Let us start with some technical results on hardness of calculating the Walsh spectra.
Proposition 1 A Boolean function f is available in the form of an oracle.
1. SAT is Turing reducible to computing Walsh transform at the point 0.
2. Finding Wf (0) is outside P
NP.
3. Given a non zero ω, finding Wf(ω) is outside P
NP.
Proof : The function f is not satisfiable, iff Wf(0) = 2
n. This proves item 1.
Now we prove item 2. In [10], the following problem has been presented which is outside
PNP. A Boolean function f with wt(f) either 2n−2 or 3 · 2n−2 is given in the form of an
oracle. One has to identify which one is this. Note that wt(f) = 2n−2 iff Wf(0) = 2n−1
and wt(f) = 3 · 2n−2 iff Wf(0) = −2n−1. Thus the result.
The proof of item 3 is as follows. Wf (0) = Wf⊕ω·x(ω). If the oracle of f is available,
then it is easy to construct the oracle of f ⊕ ω · x. Hence the proof.
We have already discussed in Algorithm 1 that the best known classical algorithm
for calculating the Walsh spectra of an n-variable Boolean function requires the truth
table of size 2n as an input and then the algorithm requires O(2n) time. Let us now
describe our interpretation of Deutsch-Jozsa Algorithm in terms of Walsh spectra. Note
that
∑
z∈{0,1}n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·z⊕f(x)|z〉
2n
=
∑
z∈{0,1}n
Wf (z)
2n
|z〉, i.e., the associated probability
with a state |z〉 is W
2
f
(z)
22n
. Hence we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Given an n-variable Boolean function f , the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm (Al-
gorithm 2) produces a super position of all the states z ∈ {0, 1}n at the measurement point
M with amplitude
Wf (z)
2n
corresponding to each state z.
Now let us describe the following problem which has been presented in [2] as parity
problem.
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Problem 1 [2] Let f be an linear n-variable Boolean function, i.e., f(x) = ω ·x, available
in the form of an oracle, Find out the ω.
For a linear function f(x) = ω · x, Wf (ω) = 2n and Wf(z) = 0, for z 6= ω. Thus the
observed state of n bits in the Step 5 of Algorithm 2 will clearly output ω itself (with
probability
W 2
f
(ω)
22n
= 1). Thus the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm solves this problem in constant
time. In classical model this problem clearly needs O(n) time. This difference has been
exploited and it has been shown that BPP is not equal to BQP with respect to an oracle [2].
Now we present the problem we described.
Problem 2 A Boolean function f is given in the form of an oracle. Find out an ω, such
that Wf (ω) 6= 0.
The solution to this problem using the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm works as follows. Let us
consider that S = {ω|Wf(ω) 6= 0}. For any ω ∈ {0, 1}n \ S, Wf(ω) = 0. Note that for
ω ∈ S,∑x∈{0,1}n(−1)f(x)⊕x·ω is nonzero and for ω ∈ {0, 1}n\S,
∑
x∈{0,1}n(−1)f(x)⊕x·ω is zero.
We have already discussed that the associated probability with a state |z〉 is W
2
f
(z)
22n
. Here
the probability associated with |z〉 is nonzero when z ∈ S and the probability associated
with |z〉 is 0 when z ∈ {0, 1}n \ S. It is clear that the sum of probabilities associated with
the states in S is 1. Thus, the state, say ω, observed after the measurement at Step 5
belongs to S and for the observed ω, Wf (ω) 6= 0. Hence the Problem 2 can be solved in
constant time using the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm.
Based on the above discussion we have the following result.
Theorem 1 The Problem 2 belongs to EQP with respect to the oracle f .
Now we present a related problem where one needs to find out the maximally correlated
linear or affine function with respect to f .
Problem 3 A Boolean function f is given in the form of an oracle. Find out an ωˆ, such
that |Wf(ωˆ)| = maxω∈{0,1}n |Wf(ω)|.
Algorithm 2 does not guarantee the answer to Problem 3. Since Algorithm 2 is probabilistic
in nature, it may very well happen that it outputs some ω′, for which Wf(ω′) 6= 0, but
|Wf(ω′)| < |Wf(ωˆ)|. That means we get a linear or affine function which is correlated to
f , but not maximally correlated.
There exists a sub class of Boolean functions, the bent functions [20], for which one
can solve Problems 2, 3 in one step using classical computational model also. For a bent
function f , Wf (ω) = ±2n2 , for any ω ∈ {0, 1}n. Thus if it is known that the function is a
bent function, then one can choose any ω and produce that as the output. However, it is
very clear these problems are not easy in general.
One very interesting class of Boolean functions are the ones where the Walsh spec-
tra become three valued 0,±2k. These functions are referred as plateaued functions in
literature [25, 6]. The class of plateaued functions contains cryptographically significant
Boolean functions, including certain classes of resilient functions [25, 22, 6] and hence these
functions are actually used in crypto systems. Now consider the following problem.
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Problem 4 A plateaued Boolean function f (i.e., Wf (ω) can take the values 0,±2k) is
given in the form of an oracle. Find out an ωˆ, such that |Wf(ωˆ)| = maxω∈{0,1}n |Wf(ω)|,
which is equivalent to find out an ωˆ, such that Wf (ωˆ) 6= 0.
Clearly Algorithm 2 outputs proper solution in one step, but the best known classical algo-
rithm till date which can deterministically solve this problem is the Fast Walsh transform
which requires O(n2n) time in worst case. The information that the Walsh spectra is three
valued does not help in the calculation of Walsh spectra in a better way on the classical
model.
There are different kinds of resilient, correlation immune and other cryptographically
significant Boolean functions [25, 21, 22, 5, 6] with three valued Walsh spectra. These
functions are used for robust design of crypto systems. Getting a linear or affine function
which is maximally correlated to the Boolean function in constant time directly helps
in cryptanalysis of such crypto systems and presents an application to Algorithm 2, the
Deutsch-Jozsa Algorithm [7].
We further restrict the Problem 4 and present the following problem to highlight the
exponential speed up of quantum algorithms over classical domain.
Problem 5 A plateaued n-variable (n odd) Boolean function f with three valued Walsh
spectra 0,±2n+12 is given in the form of an oracle. Find out an ω, such that Wf(ω) 6= 0.
Algorithm 2 solves this problem in one step.
Theorem 2 Problem 5 belongs to EQP with respect to the oracle f .
The best known classical algorithm, fast Walsh transform, needs O(n2n) time and the
structure of the problem does not reveal anything to present a better deterministic classical
algorithm. To analyse the situation in more details, let us define restricted Walsh transform.
The restricted Walsh transform of f(x) on a subset T of {0, 1}n is a real valued function
over {0, 1}n which is defined as
Wf(ω)|T =
∑
x∈T
(−1)f(x)⊕x·ω.
Any NP machine can guess an ω but it is impossible to verify in polynomial time whether
the value of Walsh spectra at chosen ω is non zero. This is because f is presented as a
black box and thus one needs to query the value of f in at least 2n−1+1 times at the best
case to decide whether Wf(ω) is non zero. Let T ⊂ {0, 1}n such that |T | = 2n−1 + 1. If
one finds that Wf (ω)|T is 2n−1 + 1 or −2n−1 − 1, then it is clear that Wf(ω) cannot be
zero. However, it is not possible to decide whether Wf(ω) is 0 or ±2n+12 from Wf(ω)|T
when |T | ≤ 2n−1. Thus the verification stage needs O(2n) many queries to the oracle at
the best case.
Though we can not present any formal proof, it seems that Problem 5 is outside BPP
(may be even outside PH) with respect to the oracle f and once such a result can be proved,
the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm can be used to present a relativized separation between BPP
(may be PH) and EQP. This we place as an important open problem in this direction.
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3 Problems in BQP
Let us consider a subset of Boolean functions with the following property.
Ln = {f ∈ Ωn|d(f, l) ≤ 2n−3, l ∈ L(n)}.
Proposition 3 |Ln| = 2n∑2n−3i=0
(
2n
i
)
.
Proof : Let Lln = {f ∈ Ωn|d(f, l) ≤ 2n−3}. Since for distinct l1, l2 ∈ L(n), d(l1, l2) = 2n−1,
we have Ll1n ∩ Ll2n = ∅. Also it is clear that |Ll1n | = |Ll2n |. Since, |L(n)| = 2n, and
Ln = ∪l∈L(n)Lln, |Ln| = 2n|Lln| for some l ∈ L(n). Now |Lln| =
∑2n−3
i=0
(
2n
i
)
as one can
choose i (0 ≤ i ≤ 2n−3) many positions in the truth table of the linear function l and
complement them to get an f . This gives the proof.
From [13, Page 165],
∑λu
i=0
(
u
i
)
≤ 2uH(λ), where the binary entropy function H(λ) =
−λ log2 λ − (1 − λ) log2(1 − λ). Also it is clear that
∑2n−3
i=0
(
2n−3
i
)
<
∑2n−3
i=0
(
2n
i
)
. Thus,
22
n−3
< |L|n = ∑2n−3i=0
(
2n
i
)
≤ 22nH( 18 ).
Let us consider the following problem which is a restricted version of Problem 3.
Problem 6 An n-variable (n odd) Boolean function f ∈ Ln is given in the form of an
oracle. Find out an ωˆ, such that |Wf(ωˆ)| = maxω∈{0,1}n |Wf(ω)|.
Lemma 1 Problem 6 belongs to BQP with respect to the oracle f .
Proof : If f ∈ Ln, then d(f, ωˆ ·x) ≤ 2n−3, i.e., Wf (ωˆ) ≥ 2n−2d(f, ωˆ ·x) = 2n−2n−2. Thus
the success probability of Algorithm 2 is ≥ (2n−2n−2
2n
)2 = 9
16
. The probability of getting a
wrong answer is ≤ 7
16
.
Now we refine these results a little bit to extend the class Ln. Let
Ln,ǫ = {f ∈ Ωn|d(f, l) ≤ (1 + (3− 2
√
2− 4ǫ))2n−3, l ∈ L(n), 0 < ǫ < 3− 2
√
2
4
}.
It is clear that |Ln,ǫ| > |Ln| as 3− 2
√
2− 4ǫ > 0, for the given range of ǫ.
If f ∈ Ln,ǫ, then d(f, ωˆ ·x) ≤ (1+ (3−2
√
2−4ǫ))2n−3, i.e., Wf(ωˆ) ≥ 2n−2d(f, ωˆ ·x) =
2n−2n−2(4−2√2−4ǫ). Thus the success probability of Algorithm 2 is ≥ (2n−2(2
√
2+4ǫ)
2n
)2 =
( 1√
2
+ ǫ)2 = 1
2
+
√
2ǫ+ ǫ2 > 1
2
+ ǫ. The probability of getting a wrong answer is < 1
2
− ǫ.
Noting
√
2 < 1.415, one can use a small constant ǫ such that
Ln,ǫ = {f ∈ Ωn|d(f, l) ≤ 1.17 · 2n−3, l ∈ L(n)}.
Based on the above results we present the following problem and corollary.
Problem 7 An n-variable (n odd) Boolean function f ∈ Ln,ǫ is given in the form of an
oracle. Find out an ωˆ, such that |Wf(ωˆ)| = maxω∈{0,1}n |Wf(ω)|.
Corollary 1 Problem 7 belongs to BQP with respect to the oracle f .
To the best of our knowledge, there is no other way to solve Problem 6 and Problem 7
deterministically in classical domain without calculating the Walsh spectra.
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4 Conclusion
In this note, we identify a large set of problems which are in EQP or BQP with respect to
an oracle f , where f is an n-variable Boolean function available in the form of a black box.
We have used the basic Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm to prove our results and show further
applications to this well known algorithm. The only known tool to solve these problems
in classical computational model is calculation of Walsh spectra which requires O(n2n)
time. It is left open whether these problems are indeed hard to solve from complexity
theoretic viewpoint. If that can be shown then the problems mentioned here, along with
the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm can be used to prove important results related to relativized
separation between BPP (may be PH) and EQP or BQP.
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